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IN LIGHT OF CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON
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ACTS OF
VIOLENCE

INTRODUCTION

Veronica Williams's story is all too familiar. Veronica's "pictureperfect" marriage to Cleaven Williams was shattered on a Friday
night in January 2005 when Cleaven slapped, choked, and kicked
Veronica in an upstairs bedroom. 1 As she pleaded with him to stop,
he pistol whipped her with a .45-caliber handgun and fired a shot at
her feet, just missing her. 2 Veronica was able to escape the house and
went to the police, but provided a false name and a false story
claiming she had just been robbed. 3
Cleaven fled to the home of a female acquaintance. 4 While staying
there he punched holes in the wall, threw pictures, and attempted to
rape her; she refused to press charges. 5 While Cleaven fled, Veronica
left town to visit relatives in another state. 6 Cleaven tracked her
down and brought her back to Maryland assuring her that everything
would change. 7
Nothing did change. The physical and emotional abuse continued. 8
Veronica did not want to leave for fear that her children would live
without a father. 9 Finally, Veronica worked up the courage to tell
Cleaven she was leaving again; in retaliation, Cleaven cut off all of
her hair. 10

l.

Melissa Harris, No Safe Place: In Danger at Home, Let down by the Law, a Woman
Fleeing Brutality Loses Her Life, THE BALT. SUN, Dec. 14, 2008, at 18.

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Jd.
ld.
Jd.
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10.

ld.
Jd.
ld.
Jd.
Jd.
Jd.
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The story of Veronica Williams ended on the sidewalk outside the
Baltimore City District Court, where she was filing a protective order
against Cleaven. 11 Cleaven followed Veronica to the courthouse,
darted across traffic, and stabbed her multiple times. 12 Several days
later, Veronica died with her children by her side as doctors removed
her from a ventilator. 13 Doctors discovered something else, a threeto-six-week-old fetus with a faint heartbeat. 14
Although Veronica had pressed charges against Cleaven/ 5 the
shooting incident, along with any 911 calls or statements made to
police and social workers, would have been inadmissible at any
subsequent trial for domestic violence, hindering a proper
prosecution. 16 This Comment attempts to address the problems of
domestic violence prosecutions and provide a recommendation to
prevent an outcome similar to Veronica Williams's.
The pervasiveness of domestic violence throughout the United
States is staggering. According to the United States Department of
Justice (USDOJ), approximately 1.3 million women are physically
assaulted by an intimate partner annually. 17 The prevalence of
domestic violence in Maryland is no less daunting. According to the
2007 Maryland Uniform Crime Report (UCR), compiled by the
Maryland State Police, there were a total of 19,391 domestic crimes
reported throughout the state in 2007. 18

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

/d.
/d.
/d.
!d.
!d.
See infra Part III.C.2.
PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FULL REPORT OF THE

18.

PREVALENCE, INCIDENCE, AND CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN at iv, 26
(2000), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesllnij/183781.pdf.
Although
domestic violence can and does affect men and those in homosexual relationships, the
primary victims are women in heterosexual relationships. See MARYLAND STATE
POLICE, CRIME IN MARYLAND 2007 UNIFORM CRIME REPORT 52, 57 (2007). Therefore,
throughout this Comment, the victim will be referred to as a woman in a heterosexual
relationship.
MARYLAND STATE POLICE, supra note 17, at 53. The 2007 level slightly decreased
from the 2006level of21,965. /d. Baltimore County averaged the highest number of
domestic violence incidents over a five-year period followed by Baltimore City,
Prince George's County, and then Montgomery County. /d. at 60. During the fiveyear period, an average of20,864 incidents were reported throughout the state. /d.
Although the UCR provides useful data, the UCR only provides statistics on
reported domestic violence incidents to local police ~epartments. See id. at 53.
Therefore, unreported incidents of domestic violence remain unclear. See id.
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The prosecution of domestic violence cases is difficult for varying
reasons, including a victim's lack of cooperation or lack of physical
evidence. 19 Prior to 2004, prosecutors routinely relied on victim
statements, admitted at trial through a hearsay exception, to
supplement the lack of physical evidence, the lack of victim
cooperation, or both. 2° Following the 2004 decision of the Supreme
Court of the United States, Crawford v. Washington/' the customary
tools of introducing hearsay statements in a domestic violence
prosecution through a hearsay exception has become limited. 22
Crawford holds that hearsay statements deemed "testimonial" violate
the Sixth Amendment and cannot be admitted at trial. 23 In the context
of domestic violence cases, Crawford and its progeny have severely
limited the prosecution's ability to admit a victim's hearsay
statements because they routinely fall under the Supreme Court's
definition of testimonial. 24
Moreover, current evidence law in Maryland prohibits the
introduction of a defendant's past acts of domestic violence. 25 This
prohibition affects domestic violence prosecutions because domestic
violence is a highly recidivistic crime; prosecutors would like to use
past acts of domestic violence to show that the defendant committed
the same crime before and therefore is more likely to have committed
the current charge. 26 The Crawford decision and subsequent cases,
paired with Maryland evidence law banning a defendant's prior acts
of domestic violence admission into evidence, limits the tools
available to prosecutors in already difficult domestic violence
prosecutions, tipping the balance at trial heavily in favor of the
defendant.
Part II of this Comment briefly defmes domestic violence and
describes the difficulties faced in prosecuting domestic violence cases
and the hearsay tools that are commonly used to combat those
difficulties. 27

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

See infra Part Il.B.
See infra Part II. B.
541 u.s. 36 (2004).
See infra Part Ill. C.
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
Infra Part III.C.2.
MD. R. 5-404.
Infra Part III.D.l.
Infra Part II.

470

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 39

Part III details the admissibility of hearsay in domestic violence
prosecutions under Crawford and its progeny. 28 Next, Part ill
describes the current Maryland law on admitting past acts of
domestic violence in a case for a current domestic violence charge. 29
Part III concludes by highlighting California Evidence Code section
1109 and similar statutes from other states that make admissible a
defendant's past acts of domestic violence in a current charge for
domestic violence. 30
Part IV argues that in light of the Crawford decision, coupled with
current evidence law banning a defendant's past acts of domestic
violence and the difficult nature of domestic violence prosecutions,
the balance at trial has tipped heavily in the defendant's favor and is
obscuring the search for the truth. 31 Therefore, Part IV also argues
that Maryland should adopt a statute similar to section 1109. 32 The
recidivistic nature of domestic violence and past acts' predictability
of future acts of domestic violence support the inference that prior
acts of domestic violence infer guilt on the current charge. 33 In
addition, Part IV analyzes the positive aspects of section 1109 and the
proposal, including their ability to protect the defendant's rights. 34
By adopting such a proposal, the prosecution will have a tool to bring
the balance at trial back to equilibrium. The overall goal of this
Comment is to shed light on the problems of domestic violence
prosecutions and encourage the Maryland General Assembly to take
action.
II.

THE PROBLEMS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
PROSECUTIONS

A.

Domestic Violence Definition

Domestic violence is prevalent nationwide as well as throughout
The question remains, what exactly is domestic
Maryland. 35
violence? Domestic violence does not have one specific definition;
various states and the federal government provide their own
definitions. Under Maryland law, a victim of domestic violence is
defined as "an individual who has received deliberate, severe, and
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Infra Part liLA-C.
Infra Part III.D.l.
Infra Part III.D.2.a-b.
Infra Part N.
Infra Part N.
Infra Part N.
Infra Part N.
See supra text accompanying notes 17-18.
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demonstrable physical injury, or is in fear of imminent deliberate,
severe, and demonstrable physical injury from a current or former
spouse, or a current or former cohabitant. " 36
From another
perspective, the USDOJ defines domestic violence as "a pattern of
abusive behavior in any relationship that is used by one partner to
gain or maintain power and control over another intimate partner.'m
Although the definitions differ, the ultimate goal is to identify the
same type of victim.
B.

Difficulties Prosecuting Domestic Violence

Domestic violence is a serious problem with grave ramifications.
Domestic violence can cause the victim psychological distress,
resulting in problems with future relationships and future
victimization. 38 Allowed to continue, domestic violence can impact
children physically and increase the likelihood that the child who
witnessed domestic violence will become abused in the future. 39
Ultimately and tragically, domestic violence can end with spousal
murder. 40
Many argue that prosecutions, by placing the abuser in jail or
counseling, are necessary to decrease the prevalence of domestic

36.
37.

38.

39.
40.

MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW§ 4-513 (LexisNexis 2006).
USDOJ: Office on Violence Against Women, About Domestic Violence, http://www.
ovw.usdoj.gov/domviolence.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2010). The U.S. Department of
Justice describes five different sub-categories of domestic violence. !d. First,
physical abuse, which involves hitting but can also involve forced drug use or the
denial of medical care. !d. Second, sexual abuse, which involves coercion in sexual
contact or behavior such as marital rape. !d. Third, emotional abuse, which involves
the weakening of an individual's self-worth through acts including constant criticism.
!d. Fourth, economic abuse, which involves financial dependency by controlling all
fmancial aspects of a person. !d. Finally, psychological abuse, which is fear through
intimidation by threatening harm to the individual, her children, or her family and
friends. !d.
See Mary Ann Dutton, Understanding Women's Responses to Domestic Violence: A
Redefinition of Battered Woman Syndrome, 21 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1191, 1221, 1224--25
(1993).
Tonya McCormick, Note and Comment, Convicting Domestic Violence Abusers When
the Victim Remains Silent, 13 BYU J. Pus. L. 427,429-30 (1999).
Callie Marie Rennison, Intimate Partner Violence, 1993-2001, Bureau of Justice
Statistics Crime Data Brief(U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau
of Justice Statistics, Wash., D.C.), Feb. 2003, at 1-2, available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.
gov/content/pub/pd£'ipv0l.pdf. In 2000, throughout the United States, 1247 women
were killed by an intimate partner. !d. This figure accounts for 33.5% of murders of
all women in 2000. !d. In Maryland, thirty of the domestic violence incidents
resulted in homicide. MARYLAND STATE POLICE, supra note 17, at 61.

472

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 39

violence and, in turn, its effects as described above. 41 However,
convictions can be hard to obtain. 42 A primary reason for this
difficulty is that victims of domestic violence, after initially
cooperating with the police, sometimes refuse to cooperatetestifying on behalf of the batterer, requesting a dismissal of the
charges, refusing to testify, recanting, or generally refusing to assist
the prosecution. 43 Some evidence suggests that eighty to ninety
percent of domestic violence victims will recant at some point. 44
The victim's lack of cooperation can be traced to the significant
control that the batterer exerts over the victim. One theory describing
the control in an abusive relationship is the "cycle of violence."45
The cycle of violence, initially described by Lenore Walker in 1979,
consists of three stages: the tension-building phase, the acute
battering phase, and the tranquil-loving phase often referred to as the
honeymoon phase. 46 The tension-building phase involves minor
abusive incidents. 47 Although the victim tries to please the abuser,
the incidents evolve into the acute-battering phase where the most
violent attacks occur, ending only at the desire of the abuser. 48
Finally, in the honeymoon phase, the batterer will express regret for
41.
42.

43.

J. Alex Little, Balancing Accountability and Victim Autonomy at the International
Criminal Court, 38 GEO. J. INT'L L. 363, 382 (2007).
Tragically, prosecutions for domestic violence have come too late for many victims.
Among those incarcerated for spousal abuse in state prisons, fifty percent are there for
spousal murder. MATIHEW R. DUROSE ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FAMILY
VIOLENCE STATISTICS INCLUDING STATISTICS ON STRANGERS AND ACQUAINTANCES 3
(2005), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf!fvs.pdf.
Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers After Crawford, 91 VA. L. REv. 747, 768 (2005);
Jennifer Gentile Long, Prosecuting Intimate Partner Sexual Assault, 10 CONNECTIONS
22, 24-25 (2008). This differs from assaults where the victim does not know the
perpetrator and is more willing to cooperate. Lisa Marie De Sanctis, Bridging the

Gap Between the Rules of Evidence and Justice for Victims of Domestic Violence, 8
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 359, 367 (1996).
44.

45.
46.

47.
48.

See, e.g., Lininger, supra note 43, at 768; Douglas E. Beloof & Joel Shapiro, Let the
Truth Be Told: Proposed Hearsay Exceptions to Admit Domestic Violence Victims'
Out of Court Statements as Substantive Evidence, 11 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. I, 3
(2002) ("The head of the Family Violence Division of the Los Angeles District
Attorney's Office estimates that ninety percent of domestic violence victims recant.");
De Sanctis, supra note 43, at 367 ("(V]ictims of domestic violence are uncooperative
in approximately eighty to ninety percent of cases.").
LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME 95-104 (Springer Publ'g Co.
1984).
!d. at 95; see McCormick, supra note 39, at 431; Orly Rachmilovitz, Bringing Down
the Bedroom Walls: Emphasizing Substance over Form in Personalized Abuse, 14
WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 495, 508 (2008).
Rachmilovitz, supra note 46, at 508.

/d.
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his behavior, often swearing it will not happen again. 49 The victim
will believe that her abuser will revert to the man that he was when
she first started the relationship. 50 However, this phase will
eventually yield to the tension-building phase, repeating the cycle
over again. 51 The cycle of violence is one theory that explains the
recidivism in domestic violence. 52 Prosecution most likely occurs
after the battering incident in the acute-battering phase; 53 by the time
the prosecution is underway, the victim will have progressed to the
honeymoon phase where she forgives the abuser and will be less
willing to cooperate with prosecutors. 54
Although Walker's theory is helpful in understanding domestic
violence relationships, the cookie-cutter description has often been
criticized as an inaccurate description of every abusive relationship. 55
Other scholars have theorized that innate in every domestic violence
relationship is "coercive control." 56
That is, throughout the
relationship there is "an ongoing strategy of intimidation, isolation
and control that extends to all areas of [the victim's] life, including
access to food, money, help, protection, friendships, family and
children; work; transportation; control over her own sexuality; and
the minutiae of every day life." 57 The high level of control in the
relationship leads the victim to have less autonomy and
independence, leading to a diminished ability to seek help or assist in
a prosecution. 58
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

54.
55.

56.

57.

58.

McCormick, supra note 39, at 431.
/d.
Rachrnilovitz, supra note 46, at 508.
/d.
See Pamela Vartabedian, Comment, The Need to Hold Batterers Accountable:
Admitting Prior Acts of Abuse in Cases of Domestic Violence, 47 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 157, 159.....{)0 (2007).
See id. at 160.
See, e.g., Marina Angel, Why Judy Norman Acted in Reasonable Self-Defense: An
Abused Woman and a Sleeping Man, 16 BUFF. WOMEN'S L.J. 65, 75 (2008); Megan G.
Thompson, Comment, Mandatory Mediation and Domestic Violence: Reformulating
the Good-Faith Standard, 86 OR. L. REv. 599, 615 (2007).
See Tamara L. Kuennen, Analyzing the Impact of Coercion on Domestic Violence
Victims: How Much Is Too Much?, 22 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 2, 8-10
(2007). This theory was first articulated by Susan Schechter and built upon by Evan
Stark. /d.
/d. at 10. A helpful visual tool to explain the control in a domestic violence
relationship is the power and control wheel. See id. at 9. The Domestic Abuse
Intervention Project in Duluth, Minnesota developed the power and control wheel,
and domestic violence experts routinely use it. /d. at 19 n.39.
See id. at 10.
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Aside from control, a victim's refusal to cooperate with the
prosecution may also stem from the fear of retaliation by the
barterer. 59 Studies have shown that the most dangerous time for a
victim is when she attempts to break free from a violent relationship
and seek prosecution. 60
Other factors also cause a victim to recant or refuse to testify,
further hindering domestic violence prosecutions. The victim may
have an economic dependence on her abuser and fear that she would
be unable to independently provide for herself or her children. 61
Additional factors include: continued emotional attachment;
reluctance to break up families, including fear that children will be
placed into state custody; religious and cultural views; "'learned
helplessness"' based on repeated abuse; and, a genuine belief that
things have gotten better, specifically during the honeymoon phase of
the cycle of abuse. 62 In Maryland, the law even allows a spousal
victim of domestic violence a one-time refusal to testify. 63 Lastly, in
the most extreme cases, victim cooperation is absent because the
domestic violence assault resulted in the victim's death. 64
It is difficult to prosecute domestic violence without victim
cooperation. Domestic violence cases often leave scant physical
evidence (i.e. physical evidence, such as bruises or scratches, have
not materialized or a delay in reporting the domestic abuse causes
physical evidence to dissipate) that, even when present, can be
interpreted in many different ways. 65 When physical evidence of
abuse is lacking, prosecutors rely heavily on hearsay statements to
explain what occurred. 66 Hearsay is used to "'connect the dots'"
when the victim does not testify. 67 For example, a victim's statement
to a responding police officer that the abuser "'kicked [me] in the
leg"' and "'grabbed [me] around the neck"' would be used to
describe, in lieu of a testifying victim, what occurred. 68 Without the
59.
60.
61.

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

See Lininger, supra note 43, at 769 (noting a study which found that thirty percent of
batterers assault their victims during the predisposition phase of prosecution).
Jd.
I d. This fear may be more of a reality; fifty percent of battered women drop below the
poverty line after leaving their abusers. Jd. Also, a study has found that in forty-two
percent of cases, batterers threatened to reduce economic support in retaliation for
continued assistance with the prosecution. ld. at 769-70.
Jd. at 770.
Mo. CODE ANN., CTS. & Juo. PROC. § 9-106(a)(2)(iii) (LexisNexis 2006).
See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
Lininger, supra note 43, at 771.
See id. at 771-72.
Jd. at 771.
See State v. Lucas, 407 Md. 307, 309, 965 A.2d 75, 77 (2009).
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hearsay statements "[t]he quantum of proof ... may be so low that
the absence of hearsay necessitates dismissal." 69
For many years, hearsay statements by a victim who refused to
cooperate with the prosecution had been admissible at trial through
various exceptions. 70 However, the Supreme Court's decision in
Crawford v. Washington 11 has limited the admissibility of hearsay
statements in prosecutions for domestic violence. 72
III. THE CURRENT LAW: CRAWFORD, HEARSAY
EXCEPTIONS, AND THE PROPENSITY RULE
A.

Hearsay and Hearsay Exceptions

Hearsay is defined as "a statement, other than one made by the
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence
to prove the truth of the matter asserted." 73 The declarant is the
person making the statement. 74 Generally, a hearsay statement is
inadmissible at trial. 75 The hearsay rule is intended to prevent a
statement's admission into evidence where the cross-examiner has
not had an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant and expose
weaknesses in the statement, such as defects in perception, memory,
and sincerity, as well as defects in transmission of the statement. 76
There are, however, numerous exceptions and exemptions to the

69.

70.
71.
72.
73.

74.
75.

76.

Lininger, supra note 43, at 771. The use of hearsay in a domestic violence trial also
has other benefits. It abates the motivation for an abuser to intimidate the victim
while waiting for trial. !d. If live testimony were used, the victim would be subject to
constant intimidation to change her testimony and cause a dismissal. !d. at 771-72.
Also, by not testifying, the victim gets a reprieve from reliving the trauma of the
incident upon prosecution and defense questioning. !d.
See infra Part III.B.
541 U.S. 36 (2004).
See infra Part Ill. C. I.
Mo. R. 5-SOI(c). A "statement" is defmed as "(1) an oral or written assertion or (2)
nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by the person as an assertion." !d. 5801(a).
!d. 5-SOI(b).
!d. 5-802. If a statement is not used for its truth then it is admissible under the hearsay
rule. See GRAHAM C. LILLY, PRINCIPLES OF EVIDENCE 150 (Thomson West 4th ed.
2006). For example, a statement by a driver that a car had defective brakes can be
used to show that the driver knew the car had defective brakes, but not for the purpose
of proving that the car did indeed have defective brakes. See id.
LILLY, supra note 75, at 140, 142.
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hearsay rule, 77 some of which, as discussedd below, are relevant to
the admission of a domestic violence victim's hearsay statement.
B.

Pre-Crawford: Hearsay Statements in Domestic Violence
Prosecutions

Prior to Crawford, prosecutors would generally rely on five types
of hearsay statements: 911 calls, statements made to responding
officers or paramedics, formal statements given to police after their
initial response, statements made to individuals other than the police
(i.e. social workers, friends, or doctors), and dying declarations. 78
These hearsay statements would generally be admitted under the
excited utterance hearsay exception or the dying declaration
exception in homicide prosecutions. 79
In cases prior to Crawford, 80 excited utterances and dying
declarations were commonly admitted against defendants

77.

78.

79.

80.

See id. at 166-268. Some exceptions require unavailability of the declarant, while
others do not. Compare Mo. R. 5-804(b) (providing that the exceptions contained
therein are applicable only when the declarant is unavailable to testify), with MD. R.
5-803 (providing that under certain circumstances, a statement will not be excluded
even though the declarant is unavailable to testify). Maryland Rule 5-804(a) defines
"unavailability."
Carol A. Chase, Is Crawford a "Get Out of Jail Free" Card for Batterers and
Abusers? An Argument for a Narrow Definition of "Testimonial," 84 OR. L. REv.
1093, 1113-14 (2005).
See Lininger, supra note 43, at 776. Maryland Rule 5-803(b)(2) codifies the excited
utterance exception and makes admissible "[a] statement relating to a startling event
or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by
the event or condition." Mo. R. 5-803(b)(2). Underlying the excited utterance
exception in a domestic violence case is the theory that the circumstances of an assault
on the victim would produce enough excitement to still the victim's ability to reflect
and fabricate. FED. R. Evm. 803 advisory committee's note.
Maryland Rule 5-804(b)(2) codifies the dying declaration exception and makes
admissible "a statement made by a declarant, while believing that the declarant's death
was imminent, concerning the cause or circumstances of what the declarant believed
to be his or her impending death." Mo. R. 5-804(b)(2). Unlike the Federal Rules of
Evidence, in Maryland, the dying declaration exception applies not only in a homicide
or civil action, but also in an "attempted homicide [and] assault with intent to commit
a homicide." Mo. R. 5-804(b)(2); see also FED. R. Evm. 804(b)(2) (providing that the
dying declaration exception applies "[i]n a prosecution for homicide or in a civil
action").
Some domestic violence prosecutions also use the present sense impression
exception, which makes admissible "[a] statement describing or explaining an event
or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition, or
immediately thereafter." Mo. R. 5-803(b)(l).
See, e.g., Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
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notwithstanding the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation, 81 as
long as there was "adequate 'indicia of reliability"' and a firmlyrooted hearsay exception. 82 "Suffice to say, if a hearsay statement
was admissible under the rules of evidence, it almost always satisfied
the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation." 83
C.

Crawford and the Change to Domestic Violence Prosecutions'
Use ofHearsay

1.

The Crawford Decision

In 2004, the Supreme Court reexamined the Confrontation Clause
in Crawford v. Washington. 84 In an opinion written by Justice
Antonin Scalia, the Court expressly overruled Ohio v. Roberts 85 and
created a holding that would have lasting effects on the introduction
of hearsay statements at trial for all types of prosecutions, including
domestic violence prosecutions. 86
Michael Crawford was charged with assault and attempted murder
for trying to stab a man who allegedly raped his wife. 87 Crawford
claimed self-defense, stating that the victim reached for a weapon
first. 88 However, in a taped interrogation, Crawford's wife gave a
different account in which she stated that the victim did not have a
weapon in his hand. 89 At trial, Crawford's wife refused to testify,
81.

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

See, e.g., Byron L. Warnken, "Forfeiture by Wrongdoing" After Crawford v.
Washington: Maryland's Approach Best Preserves the Right to Confrontation, 37 U.
BALT. L. REv. 203, 205--07 (2008); Tracey L. Perrick, Comment, Crawford v.
Washington: Redefining Sixth Amendment Jurisprudence; The Impact Across the
United States and in Maryland, 35 U. BALT. L. REv. 133, 135-36 (2005).
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides, "[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses
against him." U.S. CaNST. amend. VI. One of the benefits of the Sixth Amendment,
which is similar to the reasoning of the hearsay rule, is that it requires a face-to-face
confrontation allowing cross-examination to expose discrepancies in a witness'
testimony. See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845-46 (1990). In domestic
violence cases where hearsay statements are used in lieu of or in addition to the
victim's statement, defendants can argue that they are deprived of a chance to crossexamine and confront the victim and expose flaws in their testimony.
Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65-66.
Warnken, supra note 81, at 205.
541 U.S. 36,42 (2004).
See id. at 75 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
See Perrick, supra note 81, at 143.
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 38-40.
See id. at 38-39.
/d. at 39-40.
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claiming marital privilege. 90 The prosecution proffered her taped
interrogation into evidence in lieu of her live testimony. 91 Crawford
argued that his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation was violated
because he was unable to confront his wife. 92 However, the trial
court admitted the testimony under the Roberts standard, finding that
it was reliable. 93 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine
whether the statement violated the Confrontation Clause. 94
Justice Scalia seized the opportunity to build on his dissent in
Maryland v. Craig95 and change the landscape of Sixth Amendment
right to confrontation cases. 96 In Crawford, the Court abandoned the
Roberts test. 97 First, the Court examined English law98 to discern the
Framers' intent when contemplating the Sixth Amendment. 99 The
Court determined that "the principal evil at which the Confrontation
Clause was directed was the civil-law mode of criminal procedure,
and particularly its use of ex parte examinations as evidence against
the accused." 100 The Court stated that the focus of the Sixth
Amendment is to allow the defendant to confront a witness whose
words "bear testimony." 101
Thus, the Court held that testimonial statements are inadmissible
when the witness is unavailable and there was no prior opportunity
for the defendant to cross-examine the declarant. 102 The Court's
holding effectively rejected the Roberts test of "adequate indicia of
!d. at 40.
See id. The hearsay exception that the prosecution used was "statement against penal
interest." !d. (citing WASH. R. EVID. 804(b)(3)).
!d.
92.
93.
/d. ("The trial court here admitted the statement on the latter ground, offering several
reasons why it was trustworthy: [Crawford's wife] was not shifting blame but rather
corroborating her husband's story that he acted in self-defense or 'justified reprisal';
she had direct knowledge as an eyewitness; she was describing recent events; and she
was being questioned by a 'neutral' law enforcement officer.").
94.
!d. at 42.
95.
497 U.S. 836 (1990) (holding that on a case-by-case basis and a finding of necessity
to protect a child witness, a child witness may testify through a closed circuit
television and will not violate the Sixth Amendment).
See id. at 860-70 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Warnken, supra note 81, at 208-09.
96.
97.
See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60-64.
98.
See Perrick, supra note 81, at 13~1 (discussing the English law the Court used to
interpret the Sixth Amendment).
See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43-4 7.
99.
I 00. !d. at 50.
101. /d. at 51 (quoting N. WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE (1828)). The Court described testimony as a '"solemn declaration or
affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact."' !d.
102. !d. at 68.
90.
91.

2010]

In Light of Crawford

479

reliability." 103
The Court reasoned that allowing a judge to
subjectively determine what is reliable takes away the primary virtue
of the Sixth Amendment, which is to allow the jury to determine the
reliability of the statement through cross-examination. 104 The Court
explained the failing of the Roberts test: "The unpardonable vice of
the Roberts test, however, is not its unpredictability, but its
demonstrated capacity to admit core testimonial statements that the
That is,
Confrontation Clause plainly meant to exclude." 105
testimonial statements from a witness who the defendant has not had
an opportunity to cross-examine.
The Court put off defining the exact boundaries of which
statements are testimonial, "leav[ing] for another day any effort to
spell out a comprehensive definition of 'testimonial.'" 106 However,
having found that Crawford's wife's statements to the poiice were
testimonial, it can be inferred that testimonial statements to police are
a category of statements that are inadmissible at trial when the
witness is unavailable for cross-examination. 107 The Court also stated
that, at minimum, the Sixth Amendment "applies . . . to prior
testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former
trial; and to police interrogations." 108 Subsequent cases have defined
and shaped the definition of testimonial and have had a primary
effect on domestic violence cases, where testimonial statements are
often introduced at trial to take the place of a witness who is
unavailable. 109
2.

The Crawford Decision and its Progeny's Effect on Domestic
Violence Hearsay Tools

The Crawford decision and its new standard significantly affects
the types of hearsay statements prosecutors use to introduce evidence
in domestic violence prosecutions. 110

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

See id. at 60-65.
See id. at 62.
/d. at 63.
!d. at 68.
!d. at 52, 68. The Court drew the comparison that statements made to the police in the
course of interrogations are similar to examinations by justices of the peace in
England-statements that the Framers wished to exclude by implementing the Sixth
Amendment. See id. at 52-53.
108. /d. at 68.
109. See infra Part III.C.2.
110. See supra Part III.B. Crawford only has a bearing on domestic violence prosecutions
when the victim refuses to testify. See Perrick, supra note 81, at 144. If the victim
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911 calls

As previously discussed, 911 calls are a primary tool prosecutors
use in domestic violence cases where the victim is unavailable. 111
The leading case to determine whether a 911 call is testimonial under
Crawford is Davis v. Washington. 112 In Davis, Justice Scalia took the
opportunity to elaborate on the definition of "testimonial." 113
Michelle McCottry, the victim of an alleged domestic assault at the
hands of Davis, phoned 911." 4 After an initial hang-up and a callback by the 911 operator, McCottry sought assistance from the
police. 115 After it was clear that Davis had vacated the scene, the
operator continued to ask McCottry questions about the incident. 116
At trial, McCottry did not testify and was thus considered
"unavailable." 117 The prosecution sought to introduce a recording of
the 911 call over Davis's objection on the grounds that it violated his
right to confrontation. 118

Ill.
112.
113.
114.
115.

testifies at trial, she has made herself available for cross-examination and thus no
Confrontation Clause issue exists. See id.
See supra Part lii.B.
547 u.s. 813 (2006).
See id. at 817.
/d.
/d. at 817-18. The relevant conversation between the 911 operator and Michelle
McCottry was as follows:
911 Operator: What's going on?
Complainant: He's herejumpin' [sic] on me again.
911 Operator: Okay. Has he been drinking?
Complainant: No.
911 Operator: Okay, sweetie. I've got help started. Stay on the
line with me, okay?
Complainant: I'm on the line.
911 Operator: Listen to me carefully. Do you know his last
name?
Complainant: It's Davis.
911 Operator: Davis? Okay, what's his first name?
Complainant: Adrian.

911 Operator: Okay. What's his middle initial?
Complainant: Martell. He's runnin' [sic] now.
Jd. at817-18.
116. /d. at 818.
117. /d. at 819.
118. /d.
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The Court had to decide whether the 911 call was considered
testimonial under Crawford. 119 The Court compared McCottry's
statements to the interrogation in Crawford. 120 It noted that
statements such as McCottry's, made when it is clear that there is an
ongoing emergency, are not testimonial. 121 The Court reasoned that
statements made when the witness is seeking help are not the same as
statements made when a witness is testifying; 122 therefore, the
protections that Crawford and the Sixth Amendment provide are not
applicable. 123
The Court described the type of statement that can be classified as
an ongomg emergency:
McCottry's call was plainly a call for help against bona fide
physical threat . . . . [T]he nature of what was asked and
answered in Davis, again viewed objectively, was such that
the elicited statements were necessary to be able to resolve
the present emergency, rather than simply to learn (as in
Crawford) what had happened in the past. 124
The Court also noted the differences between the calm, stationhouse interview in Crawford versus McCottry' s "frantic" answers in
an unsafe environment. 125 The Court did note, however, that in some
circumstances, statements made during an ongoing emergency could
evolve into testimonial statements-a conversation that begins as an
inquiry into whether emergency assistance is needed can "'evolve
into testimonial statements' once that purpose has been achieved." 126
For example, in Davis, McCottry's responses to the operator's
"battery of [subsequent' questions" posed after the operator obtained
the information needed to address the ongoing emergency, "were
testimonial, not unlike the 'structured police questioning' that
occurred in Crawford." 121
What does this mean for domestic violence prosecutions? After
Davis, if a prosecutor wants to admit into evidence a recording of a
911 call when the witness is not available for cross-examination, the
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Jd. at 823.
Jd. at 827.
Jd. at 828.
Jd. ("No 'witness' goes into court to proclaim an emergency and seek help.").
See id.
Jd. at 827.
Jd.
ld. at 828 (citation omitted).
Jd. at 828-29.

482

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 39

statement must have been made when an ongoing emergency was
present. 128 If the statement becomes a narrative and is more akin to
the victim "testifying" rather than seeking help, the statement cannot
be admitted into evidence. 129 While many portions of 911 calls can
still be readily admitted into evidence under Davis, many recordings
are excluded if a judge finds that the emergency had ended. 130
b.

Statements to responding or investigating officers

Prior to Davis and its companion case Hammon v. Indiana, 131 there
was an open question as to whether statements made to officers
responding to a domestic disturbance or statements made to an
investigating officer who had returned to conduct an investigation
were testimonial. 132
In Hammon, the Court examined the admissibility of statements
made to police in a non-emergency situation. 133 Police responded to a
domestic violence call. 134 Upon arrival, the officers separated the
husband, Hershel Hammon, and his wife, Amy Hammon. 135 An
officer asked Amy what had happened and Amy stated that she was
not in any immediate danger. 136 Still, the officer had Amy fill out an
affidavit describing the domestic assault. 137 At trial, Amy was
subpoenaed but did not appear. 138 Hammon objected to the use of the
affidavit, admitted through the "present sense impression" hearsay
exception. 139 Hammon also objected to testimony admitted through
the "excited utterance" exception from an officer indicating that Amy
stated that Hammon was irate. 140 Nevertheless, the trial court
admitted the evidence over Hammon's objection. 141
The Supreme Court held that the affidavit and Amy's statements to
the officer were testimonial. 142 The Court reasoned that there was no

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

See id. at 828.
See id.
Seeid.
547

u.s. 813 (2006).

See id. at 81 7.
!d. at 829.
!d. at 819.
!d. at 819-20.
!d. at 830.
!d. at 820.
!d.
!d.
!d.
!d.
See id. at 829-30.
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emergency; in fact, Amy had informed the officer that "there was no
immediate threat to her person." 143 The Court stated:
When the officer questioned Amy . . . and elicited the
challenged statements, he was not seeking to determine (as
in Davis) 'what is happening,' but rather 'what happened.'
Objectively viewed, the primary, if not indeed the sole,
purpose of the interrogation was to investigate a possible
crime-which is, of course, precisely what the officer
should have done. 144
Hammon is an example of when an ongoing emergency has
dissipated and a once non-testimonial environment quickly turned
testimonial. 145 Therefore, the Supreme Court held that when a
responding officer arrives, if there is no ongoing emergency, the
statements made to the responding officer are testimonial. 146 This
further means that any statement made to an officer who is
investigating a crime rather than responding to a call for help will be
held inadmissible. 147 Post Crawford, Davis, and Hammon, it is clear
that there is greater difficulty introducing domestic violence victims'
hearsay statements made to responding and investigating police
officers. 148
c.

Statements made to persons other than police officers

The Supreme Court has yet to decide whether a domestic violence
victim's statements to social workers, medical personnel, friends, or
relatives are testimonial. However, the Court of Appeals of

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

/d.
/d. at 830.
/d. at 828-29.
/d. at 822.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland, in the recent decision State v. Lucas, 407 Md. 307,
965 A.2d 75 (2009), addressed a factual scenario that closely paralleled Hammon.
Where two police officers had separated the abuser and victim in a domestic violence
incident, the responding officer's questions of'"What happened?"' and '"Where [did
you get] the marks?'" were held not to be enabling the police to meet an ongoing
emergency because any threat was already under control and the primary purpose was
to "prove past events . . . relevant to later criminal prosecution"; therefore, the
victim's statements to the police were testimonial. /d. at 326, 965 A.2d at 87.
148. Lininger, supra note 43, at 776. "[A] survey of West Coast prosecutors found that
since the Crawford ruling, [eighty-seven] percent of respondents have encountered
greater difficulty in introducing victims' hearsay statements elicited by investigation
officers at the scene of the alleged domestic abuse." /d.
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Maryland confronted the issue in State v. Snowden. 149 In Snowden,
the State sought to admit statements made by child abuse victims to a
social worker through the "tender years" statute, which allows social
workers to testify in place of child abuse victims. 150 The defendant
objected to the admission of the social worker's testimony, claiming
that it violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. 151
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the crux of the
question is whether the victim's statements to the social worker were
part of a formal interrogation. 152 Courts differ on defining an
interrogation; some courts will look to the intent of the parties
involved in the conversation, placing emphasis on whether there was
intent to gather evidence. 153 Other courts examine factors such as
formality, an adversarial relationship, who initiated the conversation,
and passive listening to determine if a statement to a responding
officer is testimonial. 154 In Snowden, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland provided its own definition of what constitutes an
interrogation:
No matter what other motives exist, if a statement is made
under such circumstances that would lead an objective
person to believe that statements made in response to
government interrogation later would be used at trial, the
admission of those statements must be conditioned upon
Crawford's requirements of unavailability and a prior
opportunity to cross-examine. 155
The court held the statements in Snowden to be testimonial because
the children were brought to the social worker for the express
purpose of developing testimony for trial and were interviewed in
order to develop their testimony for trial. 156 The court also stated that
"an ordinary person in the position of any of the declarants would
have anticipated the sense that [their] statements to the sexual abuse

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

385 Md. 64, 867 A.2d 314 (2005).
/d. at 73, 867 A.2d at 319.
ld
See id. at 82-83, 867 A.2d at 324-25.
See, e.g., United States v. Saner, 313 F. Supp. 2d 896, 901-{)2 (S.D. Ind. 2004); State
v. Bell, 603 S.E.2d 93, 116 (N.C. 2004).
154. See Perrick, supra note 81, at 140-48.
155. Snowden, 385 Md. at 92, 867 A.2d at 330.
156. /d. at 84-85, 867 A.2d at 325-26.
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investigator potentially would have been used to 'prosecute' [the
defendant]." 157
The Snowden decision means that, in Maryland, a domestic
violence victim's statements to a social worker will be inadmissible if
police bring the victim to a social worker, or the victim objectively
believes that the questions asked by the social worker would be used
at trial against the alleged abuser. 158
As for medical personnel, the Snowden court noted in dicta that
some courts have found victim statements to medical physicians to be
non-testimonial. 159 The court suggested that if the child abuse
victims had been brought to the social worker for medical or
psychological treatment, the outcome may have been different. 160
The key to determining whether a statement to medical personnel is
investigatory in nature or non-testimonial is whether the victim is
seeking medical assistance or whether the goal of the conversation is
to investigate past events. 161 In domestic violence prosecutions, this
means that a victim's statements made to doctors are most likely
admissible when the statements were made to obtain a medical

157. /d. at 84-85, 867 A.2d at 325-26. It should be noted that Snowden was decided
before Hammon and Davis. It is the author's opinion that, if taking the case now, the
Court of Appeals of Maryland may approach the analysis differently, holding instead
that when the social worker spoke with the child, there was no ongoing emergency
and therefore the statements were testimonial.
158. See id. at 92, 867 A.2d at 330. Because of Maryland's statutory law, which requires
police officers to refer domestic violence victims to social workers, Maryland social
workers have substantial contact with domestic violence victims and therefore the
admissibility of statements made to social workers is highly relevant. MD. CoDE
ANN., FAM. LAW§ 4-503(1) (LexisNexis 2006).
159. Snowden, 385 Md. at 91, 867 A.2d at 330 (citing State v. Vaught, 682 N.W.2d 284,
291-92 (Neb. 2004)).
160. See id.
161. Compare State v. Kirby, 908 A.2d 506 (Conn. 2006) (holding that .a kidnapping
victim's statements to a volunteer emergency medical technician were non-testimonial
because the statements did not identify her assailant and were pertinent to the medical
technician's treatment of the victim), and Snowden, 385 Md. 64, 867 A.2d 314
(holding that a victim's statements to a social worker were testimonial because the
victims were not brought to the social worker for medical or psychological purposes),
and State v. Stahl, 855 N.E.2d 834 (Ohio 2006) (holding that statements made to a
nurse at a hospital working for a rape victim unit were not testimonial because the
primary purpose of the statements were for medical diagnosis; the fact that the rape
unit collects evidence for prosecutions was immaterial because the primary purpose
was medical treatment), with Medina v. State, 143 P.3d 471 (Nev. 2006) (holding that
a rape victim's statement to a sexual assault nurse was testimonial because the nurse
was a police operative who gathered evidence for the prosecution).
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diagnosis or if the victim's statements were in response to a doctor's
inquiry of how the patient was injured. 162
As for statements made to private individuals, such as friends or
relatives who are not agents of the government, Crawford normally
would not apply; the goal of Crawford is to prevent government
involvement in the creation of testimony. 163 For example, the
statement of '"daddy beat me"' made by a child to his mother would
be non-testimonial. 164 However, a victim's statements made to a
private individual can be testimonial if the victim makes the
statement to the private individual with the goal of prosecution m
mind. 165
d.

Dying Declarations

As previously discussed, the dying declarations hearsay exception
may be used to admit a domestic abuse victim's statement in a
homicide prosecution, and in Maryland, for certain other crimes as
well. 166 The Supreme Court in Crawford briefly discussed this
hearsay exception. The Court noted that "(a]lthough many dying
declarations may not be testimonial, there is authority for admitting
even those that clearly are." 167 The Court continued by stating, "[w]e
need not decide in this case whether the Sixth Amendment
incorporates an exception for testimonial dying declarations. If this

162. Perrick, supra note 81, at 147. For example, a statement made to a doctor would be
testimonial if the medical personnel was an operative of the police. See Medina, 143
P.3d at 476.
163. Chase, supra note 78, at 1120.
164. State v. Buda, 912 A.2d 735, 745 (N.J. 2006); see also Medina, 143 P.3d 471 (holding
that a victim's statements to a neighbor regarding rape were not testimonial in nature);
Patano v. State, 138 P.3d 477 (Nev. 2006) (holding that statements to a father about a
sexual assault were not testimonial). One court has pointed out that it is open for
interpretation as to whether statements made to private individuals are testimonial.
State v. Mechling, 633 S.E.2d 311,324 n.lO (W.Va. 2006). 1n Mechling, where a
domestic violence victim made statements to a neighbor that the defendant had beat
her, the court noted that the Davis decision relied on cases where statements made to
private individuals would have been testimonial. /d. The court also noted that in
Davis, the Supreme Court warned readers not to infer that statements lacking any
interrogation are automatically non-testimonial. /d.
165. State v. Shafer, 128 P.3d 87, 93 & n.8 (Wash. 2006). See Richard D. Friedman,
Grappling with the Meaning of "Testimonial," 71 BROOK. L. REv. 241, 260 (2005)
("If the declarant anticipates that the statement, or the information asserted in it, will
be conveyed to the authorities and used in prosecution, then it is testimonial, whether
it is made directly to the authorities or not.").
166. See supra Part Ill. B.
167. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 n.6 (2004).
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exception must be accepted on historical grounds, it is sui generis." 168
Therefore, Crawford has impacted dying declarations the least among
the exceptions. 169
e.

Forfeiture by wrongdoing

Because Crawford has limited the ways in which prosecutors can
introduce statements of domestic violence victims, prosecutors have
increasingly relied on the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception that the
Crawford Court acknowledged. 170 The forfeiture by wrongdoing
exception allows "the prosecution [to] admit out-of-court statements,
despite the unavailability of the witness, if the defendant's wrongful
conduct procured the witness's unavailability through intimidation,
coercion, and/or violence." 171
In Giles v. California, 172 the Supreme Court addressed whether the
forfeiture by wrongdoing exception survives Crawford. In Giles, the
defendant shot and killed his ex -girlfriend. 173 At trial, Giles claimed
self-defense. 174 To rebut the defense, the prosecution sought to
introduce statements that the victim had made to a police officer
responding to a domestic disturbance call three weeks earlier. 175 In
those statements, the victim said that the two had argued, Giles had
assaulted her, and he "threatened to kill her." 176 Over Giles's
objection that his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation was
violated, the trial court admitted the statements under a California
provision that permits the introduction of out-of-court statements
describing the threat of actual or physical injury of a declarant when
the declarant is unavailable. 177
The Court held that when a declarant is unavailable because of the
defendant's actions or acquiescence, the forfeiture by wrongdoing
exception to the Confrontation Clause applies only when there was
intent on the part of the defendant to procure the declarant's
unavailability. 178 The Court explained that "intent" exists "'if the

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
1-74.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Id.
Chase, supra note 78, at 1122.
Warnken, supra note 81, at 229.
Jd. at218.
128 S. Ct. 2678 (2008).
Id. at 2681.
Id.
/d.at2681-82.
Id. at 2682.
See CAL. Evm. CODE§ 1370 (West 2009); Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2682.
Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2687-88.
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defendant has in mind the particular purpose of making the witness
unavailable. "' 179
The Court addressed the decision's effect on domestic violence
cases, but refused to carve out a separate forfeiture by wrongdoing
exception for domestic violence victims. 180 The Court did state,
however, that when an abusive relationship terminates in murder,
evidence of the intent to isolate the victim to hinder reporting of
domestic abuse would make a victim's prior statements admissible
under the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception. 181 The Court also
stated that earlier abuse, intended to dissuade the victim from seeking
outside help, would be relevant to a finding that the abuser procured
the unavailability of the victim. 182
The Court only discussed instances where the victim is unavailable
due to murder. 183 The Court did not address how Giles impacts cases
when victims are unavailable to testify because they are entrapped in
the cycle of violence. Presumably, the prosecution would need to
show that during the entire cycle of violence the abuser intended to
abuse the victim for the purpose of preventing her testimony. 184 But
what evidence would be used to prove that fact? Prosecutors would
have evidentiary problems, especially without the cooperation of the
victim, proving that the intent of the abuser was to keep the victim
from testifying or seeking help from authorities. 185 The dissent in
Giles discussed these evidentiary problems:
Consider H who assaults W, knows she has complained to
the police, and then murders her. H knows that W will be
unable to testify against him at any future trial. But who
knows whether H's knowledge played a major role, a
middling role, a minor role, or no role at all, in H's decision
to kill W? Who knows precisely what passed through H's
mind at the critical moment? 186
Therefore, forfeiture by wrongdoing, a long-standing prosecutorial
tool in domestic violence cases, has become increasingly more
difficult to use in light of Giles.

179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

/d. at 2687.
/d. at 2693.
/d.
/d.
/d.
See id. at 2687.
See id. at 2699 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
/d.
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Prosecuting Domestic Violence Under Crawford and its Progeny

As the prior discussion reveals, introducing a domestic violence
victim's out-of-court statements when the victim is unavailable has
become increasingly challenging post-Crawford.
The primary
prosecutorial tools, including 911 calls, statements made to police
officers, statements made to social workers, and statements made to
medical personnel are difficult to admit into evidence. With the
forfeiture by wrongdoing exception requiring proof of intent that the
abuse was committed for the specific purpose of causing the victim
not to testify, the admission of hearsay statements in domestic
violence prosecutions has become severely inhibited. 187 As the next
section explains, evidence law in Maryland, and most states, offers
no relief to the challenges of domestic violence prosecutions in light
of Crawford.

D.

Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Past Acts in Domestic Violence
Prosecutions

Another method to prosecute domestic violence where the victim is
unwilling or unable to testify is to introduce evidence of a
defendant's past acts of domestic violence. The theory is that past
acts of domestic violence are predictive of future conduct and that if a
batterer assaulted the victim previously, he has the propensity to have
assaulted the victim in the current case. 188 Also, past acts of domestic
violence can help explain the controlling nature of a domestic abuse
relationship and why a victim does not cooperate or refuses to
testify. 189 However, current Maryland law, as well as federal law and

187. See Lindsay Hoopes, Note, The Right to a Fair Trial and the Confrontation Clause:
Overruling Crawford to Rebalance the U.S. Criminal Justice Equilibrium, 32
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 305,341 (2009) (footnotes omitted).
[A] survey of 64 district attorney's offices in the United States
indicated that [seventy-six] percent of offices were more likely to
dismiss domestic violence cases post Crawford. For instance, in
2005 in Dallas County, Texas, judges dismissed 'up to a dozen'
domestic violence cases per day for problems related to
Crawford.
/d.
188. See Andrea M. Kovach, Note, Prosecutorial Use of Other Acts of Domestic Violence
for Propensity Purposes: A Brief Look at Its Past, Present, and Future, 2003 U. ILL.
L. REv. 1115, 1119 (2003).
189. See id. at 1138-41.
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most other state law, does not permit the admission into evidence of a
defendant's past acts of domestic violence under these theories. 190
1.

Current Maryland Law and the Propensity Rule

The propensity rule excludes evidence offered to prove that a
person acted in accordance with a prior bad act. 191 The rationale for
the propensity rule is that past acts have "little probative value as
circumstantial evidence of how a person acted on one occasion;" that
is, people sometimes act out of character. 192 The rule is also in place
because allowing such evidence could cause the fact finder to place
an undue amount of weight on the prior act, thus hindering a fair
trial. 193
Maryland has codified the propensity rule in Maryland Rule 5404. 194 Subsection (b) sets forth the propensity rule that prohibits
evidence of prior crimes, wrongs, or acts to show conformity with
those acts. 195 The rule states: "Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or
acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to
show action in conformity therewith." 196 However, the exception to
subsection (b) provides that such evidence may "be admissible for
other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, common scheme or plan, knowledge, identity, or
absence of mistake or accident." 197
What does this mean in domestic violence prosecutions? In
domestic violence prosecutions, prosecutors may argue that
propensity evidence is relevant to show intent, common plan or
scheme, and identity. 198 However, admission of a defendant's prior

190.

191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

See MD. R. 5-404; FED. R. EVID. 404; see also 6 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A.
BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE T-1, T-9, T-34 to -40 (Joseph M.
McLaughlin, ed., Matthew Bender 2d ed. 2009) (illustrating the differences between
the Federal Rule and various corresponding state rules).
LYNN MCLAIN, MARYLAND EVIDENCE: STATE AND FEDERAL, § 404:l(c)(i) (2d ed.
2001 ), available at Westlaw MDEV -STFED § 404: I.
Jd. § 404:l(c)(ii).
Jd.
See Mo. R. 5-404.
Jd.
I d. The Maryland Rule is based on Federal Rule of Evidence 404. Id.; see also FED.
R. EviD. 404.
Mo. R. 5-404.
See Kovach, supra note 188, at 1128. Maryland requires a three-step analysis to
admit a past act under one of these exceptions. Hurst v. State, 400 Md. 397, 408, 929
A.2d 157, 162 (2007) (citing State v. Faulkner, 314 Md. 630, 634-35, 552 A.2d 896,
898 (1989)).
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acts usually falls short of the requirements for admission under these
exceptions. 199 For instance, in an admission under a theory of intent
or accident in a domestic violence case, the defendant will admit the
act occurred, but assert an accident or self-defense. 200
The
prosecution, in tum, will argue the past acts should be admitted to
prove the defendant's culpable intent. In Maryland, to admit past
acts through the intent exception, the prior act must be nearly
identical to the charged act. 201 However, the similarity is analyzed by
looking at the specific acts, such as kicking, hitting, pushing, or
choking. 202 The similarity is not measured through a broader concept
such as the intent to control a person. 203 Because domestic violence
incidents tend to be dissimilar in their facts, it is unlikely that a
defendant's prior act of domestic violence will be admitted under this
theory. 204
The theory of identity is triggered in domestic violence cases when
the victim recants and states that it was someone else that beat her. 205
In Maryland, to admit prior acts under the identity theory, there must
be a "distinctive modus operandi" between the current and prior

199.
200.
201.

202.
203.
204.

205.

First, the court must decide whether the evidence falls within an
exception to Rule 5-404(b). Second, the court must decide
'whether the accused's involvement in the other crimes is
established by clear and convincing evidence.' Finally, the court
must balance the necessity for, and the probative value of, the
other crimes evidence against any undue prejudice likely to result
from its admission.
!d. (citations omitted).
See Kovach, supra note 188, at 1128-29.
DeSanctis, supra note 43, at 376.
See Harris v. State, 324 Md. 490, 503, 597 A.2d 956, 963 (1991) (holding that the
prior act was not admissible when it was "not closely linked in point of time or by
[the] circumstances").
Kovach, supra note 188, at 1129-30.
!d.
DeSanctis, supra note 43, at 376.
For example, it is unlikely that the act of killing a former
girlfriend's pet would be sufficiently similar to slapping a current
girlfriend, or stalking an ex-wife. Even though they are
conceptually similar-violent acts committed upon an intimate
partner for the purpose of maintaining power, dominance, and
control-they are factually dissimilar and therefore likely to be
held inadmissible.
!d.
!d. at 3 78.
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acts. 206 Yet, as previously described, domestic violence acts share
conceptual similarities but not factual similarities. 207 For example,
while a barterer may, on one occasion, choke a victim, and then on a
subsequent occasion, verbally assault the victim, neither are similar
enough to be classified as a modus operandi.
Finally, introducing a defendant's past acts of domestic violence
through the common plan or scheme exception may seem like the
most viable option. For example, a prosecutor would attempt to
admit a defendant's past acts of domestic violence under a theory that
there is a common plan to control the victim. 208 In Maryland, to show
common plan or scheme, there must be evidence that the defendant
conceived all the crimes as one grand plan to reach an ultimate
goal. 209 The fact that the two acts are similar in time and nature do
not automatically make it a common plan to reach an ultimate goal. 210
Although it may seem that an abuser has a common plan to control
the victim, domestic violence is unlike a case where multiple
robberies were planned together for the ultimate objective of
obtaining enough money to purchase drugs. 211 Although domestic
violence-related beatings may be similar, that is not enough to prove
an ultimate goal needed to suffice admission under the common plan
exception. 212 From the above, it is clear that "non-propensity theories
often 'do not reflect the realities of domestic violence. "' 213

See MCLAIN, supra note 191, § 404:11. See, e.g., State v. Faulkner, 314 Md. 630,
634, 552 A.2d 896, 898 (1989); McKnight v. State, 280 Md. 604, 613, 375 A.2d 551,
556 (1977).
207. DeSanctis, supra note 43, at 376; Kovach, supra note 188, at 1130.
208. See Kovach, supra note 188, at 1124-30.
209. See Tichnell v. State, 287 Md. 695, 712,415 A.2d 830, 839 (1980) ("[The] exception
permits the admission of evidence of other crimes when the several offenses are so
connected or blended in point of time or circumstances that they form one transaction,
and cannot be fully shown or explained without proving the others."); McLAIN, supra
note 191, § 404:9.
210. MCLAIN, supra note 191, § 404:9; see also Behrel v. State, 151 Md. App. 64, 123-24,
823 A.2d 696, 730 (Ct. Spec. App. 2003).
211. See State v. Jones, 284 Md. 232, 244, 395 A.2d 1182, 1188 (1979); see also MCLAIN,
supra note 191, § 404:9.
212. Cf Reidnauer v. State, 133 Md. App. 311, 323-24, 755 A.2d 553, 559--60 (Ct. Spec.
App. 2000) (arguing that while two rapes may be similar, one still needs to
demonstrate a common goal).
213. Kovach, supra note 188, at 1129 (quoting Judith Armatta, Getting Beyond the Law's
Complicity in Intimate Violence Against Women, 33 WILLAMEITE L. REV. 773, 819
(1997)).
206.
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A Countercurrent to the Norm: California Evidence Code
Section 1109 and Similar Statutes

a.

California Evidence Code Section 1109

493

In 1996, the California Legislature enacted California Evidence
Code section 1109, partly in response to the fury over the exclusion
of prior acts of domestic violence in the O.J. Simpson case where the
prosecution attempted, but was denied, the admission of past
domestic violence acts O.J. Simpson committed against his wife
Nicole Brown Simpson, to prove a course of conduct that culminated
in murder. 214 Section 1109 permits the introduction of prior acts of
domestic violence that the propensity rule would otherwise
exclude. 215 Through case law and the application of section 1109,

214. Vartabedian, supra note 53, at 168. The enacted legislation came to be known as the
"Nicole Brown Simpson Law." /d. To see a full analysis on the prosecution's theory
of attempting to admit prior acts of domestic abuse in the Simpson case, see Myrna S.
Raeder, The Admissibility of Prior Acts of Domestic Violence: Simpson and Beyond,
69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1463 (1996).
215. See CAL. Evm. CODE§ 1109 (West 2009). The relevant portion of the statute reads:
(a)(l) Except as provided in subdivision (e) or (f), in a criminal
action in which the defendant is accused of an offense involving
domestic violence, evidence of the defendant's commission of
other domestic violence is not made inadmissible by Section 1101
if the evidence is not inadmissible pursuant to Section 352.
(b) 1n an action in which evidence is to be offered under this
section, the people shall disclose the evidence to the defendant,
including statements of witnesses or a summary of the substance
of any testimony that is expected to be offered, in compliance
with the provisions of Section 1054.7 of the Penal Code.
(e) Evidence of acts occurring more than 10 years before the
charged offense is inadmissible under this section, unless the court
determines that the admission of this evidence is in the interest of
justice."
§ 1109.
The first proposal for the statute was made by Lisa Marie De Sanctis, a Deputy
District Attorney in the Ventura County District Attorney's Office. DeSanctis, supra
note 43, at 361. Ms. De Sancris recognized the problem inherent in domestic violence
prosecutions and modeled a proposal similar to Federal Rules of Evidence 413,414,
and 415. !d. California's propensity rule is codified at CAL. Evm. CODE § 1101
(West 2009).
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uncharged 216 prior acts of domestic violence committed against the
same victim217 or different victims are admissible. 218
b.

Similar acts from other states

A few other states have introduced rules similar to section 1109
with varying degrees of admissibility for prior acts. Colorado, for
example, allows evidence of prior domestic violence between the
defendant and other victims. 219 The statute states that the General
Assembly of Colorado recognizes the cyclical nature of domestic
violence and the "pattern[] of abuse." 220 Colorado courts have
recognized that the legislature intended that trial courts would allow
prior acts into evidence, specifically through common plan221 or
intent, 222 as opposed to prior acts normally excluded under these two
theories. 223 The past act must be proven by a preponderance of the
evidence, 224 and a limiting instruction must be given to the jury
advising them not to punish the defendant for the past acts but to use
such evidence only to show propensity for committing the current
charge. 225
Minnesota has a statute that provides, "[e]vidence of similar
conduct by the accused against the victim of domestic abuse, or
against other family or household members, is admissible unless the
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice." 226 Although it may seem that most prior acts of domestic
violence would be unfairly prejudicial under the statute, it has been
"interpreted not as permitting propensity evidence, but rather as
216.

217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

Kovach, supra note 188, at ll33 (citing People v. Hoover, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 208, 212
(Ct. App. 2000)); Vartabedian, supra note 53, at 168-69. The reason charged acts are
not allowed relates back to the legislative intent: "This provision allows the admission
of evidence of past acts of domestic violence, not convictions." SENATE COMMITTEE
ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, BILL ANALYSIS, 1995-1996 Sess., at 8 (Ca. 1996),
available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/95-96/bi!Vsen/sb_1851-1900/sb_1876 _ cfa
_960408 _ll 0911_sen_comrn.htrnl.
People v. Hoover, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 208, 212 (Ct. App. 2000).
People v. Brown, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 433,437-39 (Ct. App. 2000).
Cow. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 18-6-801.5(2) (West 2004).
ld. § 18-6-801.5(1).
People v. Gross, 39 P.3d 1279, 1282 (Colo. App. 2001).
People v. Ramirez, 18 P.3d 822, 828 (Colo. App. 2000).
See supra Part III.D.l.
People v. Moore, 117 P.3d l, 3 (Colo. App. 2004).
See Cow. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 18-6-801.5(5).
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 634.20 (West 2009). The court only needs to find that the
probative value outweighs the prejudicial effect to admit the prior act; no standard
such as clear and convincing evidence needs to be met. State v. McCoy, 682 N.W.2d
153, 159 (Minn. 2004).
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allowing evidence of the history of the victim and defendant's
relationship. " 227 Evidence of prior acts under this statute would
include "evidence of domestic abuse, violation of an order for
protection ... [and] violation of a harassment restraining order. " 228
Lastly, the Alaska Legislature allows "evidence of other crimes
involving domestic violence by the defendant against the same or
another person" to be admitted in a prosecution involving domestic
violence or interfering with a report of a crime involving domestic
violence. 229
IV. PROPOSAL: IN THE WAKE OF CRAWFORD, MARYLAND
SHOULD ADOPT A STATUTE SIMILAR TO SECTION 1109
TO HELP QUELL THE DIFFICULTIES OF PROSECUTING
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
Prior to Crawford, it was understandable that Maryland did not
have a law similar to section 1109. However, the interplay between
Crawford and Maryland Rule 5-404(b) necessitates a reevaluation of
current Maryland evidence law. Before Crawford, past acts of
domestic violence would have been helpful, but not essential, to a
prosecution. 230 Even without the victim's cooperation or testimony,
prosecutors could rely on victims' hearsay statements to paint a
picture of the domestic abuse. 231 However, the Court's decision in
Crawford severely limits the use of victims' hearsay statements in
domestic violence prosecutions. 232 Lacking the ability to rely on
hearsay statements, prosecutors are left with few tools to use in
domestic violence prosecutions when the victim is unavailable or
refuses to cooperate. Without the ability to introduce a defendant's
past acts of domestic violence, prosecutors are unable to tell the full
story of the abusive relationship or use their value as a predictor of
future domestic violence to convict the defendant, causing many
domestic violence prosecutions to be dismissed. 233 Because of the
unique nature of domestic violence and domestic violence
227. Kovach, supra note 188, at 1147.
228. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 634.20.
229. ALASKA R. Evm. 404(b)(4); Kovach, supra note 188, at 1141. The Alaska statute
differs from the Minnesota statute in that Minnesota does not allow evidence of past
domestic violence against a different victim, while Alaska is similar to California in
allowing evidence of prior domestic abuse against a different victim.
230. See supra text accompanying notes 64-71.
231. See supra text accompanying notes 64-69.
232. See supra Part Ill. C.
233. See supra Part III.C.3.
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prosecutions where the victim routinely is not cooperative (especially
in Maryland with the "one free slap" rule), 234 the Crawford decision,
its progeny, and Maryland Rule 5-404(b), the balance has tipped
sharply in favor of the defendant/batterer in domestic violence
prosecutions and away from the search for truth. In light of
Crawford, it is time to provide the prosecution and the victim another
tool in domestic violence prosecutions.
A. Proposal
A statute similar to section 1109, and other statutes previously
discussed, would provide such a tool while still protecting a
defendant's rights. A proper Maryland statute should allow for the
admission of a defendant's uncharged 235 prior acts of domestic abuse
against the current victim only in a prosecution for domestic
violence. Evidence, including pictures or testimony, such as that
from a witness or police officer, would be used to prove the prior acts
of domestic violence in the current prosecution. 236 The statute should
state that prior acts include, but are not limited to, evidence of prior
domestic abuse and violation of any type of protective order. 237
The statute should also provide for a limitation that allows only the
admission of past acts that occurred in the last ten years.
Furthermore, the statute should specifically state that the past acts
must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence, or if a higher
standard is desired, clear and convincing evidence. Moreover, notice
must be given to the defendant that the prior acts will be used,
describing the testimony and evidence that will be used to prove the
past acts.
In addition, the statute should provide a jury instruction that will
inform the jury that prior acts alone cannot meet the prosecution's
burden of proving the elements of the charged offense; therefore,
234. Mo. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-106 (LexisNexis 2006).
235. Although prior charged conduct is just as relevant to elaborate on the control in the
relationship, its inclusion would greatly impact a defendant's rights because, when the
conviction would be introduced at trial, a jury might automatically infer guilt of the
current charge based on a prior conviction causing the defendant to be punished again
for an already convicted charge. See MCLAIN, supra note 191, § 404:l(c)(ii).
236. See Vartabedian, supra note 53, at 181. For example, a neighbor may testify that she
heard yelling and loud noises coming from the house. A police officer may testify
that he responded to the house for a domestic violence call.
As will be discussed below, all evidentiary and constitutional procedures would be
followed when proving a past act of domestic violence. See infra Part IV.A.3.c.
23 7. Including the violation of a protective order as a prior act is important because such a
violation continues to show the extreme control that the barterer exerts over the
victim.

2010]

In Light of Crawford

497

prior acts should only be used to elaborate on the controlling nature
of the relationship and that prior acts are predictive, but not an
ultimate indicator, of guilt for the current charge. 238 Of course, the
prior act will be balanced to determine if its prejudicial effect
substantially outweighs its probative value as required by Maryland
Rule 5-403. 239
1.

Why Such a Rule Works: Prior Acts ofDomestic Violence Are
Extremely Probative in Proving that the Defendant Committed
the Charged Crime and Explaining the Controlling Nature of an
Abusive Relationship

One of the main reasons that such an evidentiary rule will work is
because domestic violence is a recidivistic crime, making prior acts
of domestic violence "'[t]he best predictor of future violence."' 240
Studies show that once violence occurs in a relationship, it reoccurs
sixty-three percent of the time. 241 Therefore, a past act is highly
predictive of guilt on the current charge. Although other crimes such
as robbery, burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft are recidivistic
crimes as well/42 a statute that permits past acts to be admitted in
those cases is not needed. These crimes do not require an
explanation of the extreme level of control as in an abusive
relationship. 243 For example, if a victim is not testifying in a larceny
prosecution, a defendant's prior act of larceny is not likely to explain
the victim's absence; whereas, in a domestic violence case, a
defendant's prior acts of abuse can explain the controlling nature of
the relationship and provide an explanation for why the victim is not
cooperating or testifying.

238. See People v. James, 96 Cal. Rptr. 2d 823, 830-31 (Ct. App. 2000).
239. Mo. R. 5-403.
240. Kelly A. Zinna & Michael Gelles, Domestic Violence and Stalking, Mo. B.J., Sept.Oct. 2003, at 54-55.
241. Steven R. Morrison, Creating Sex Offender Registries: The Religious Right and the
Failure to Protect Society's Vulnerable, 35 AM. J. CRIM. L. 23, 72 (2007). "Nearly a
third of female victims of nonlethal intimate violence were victimized at least twice
during the previous 6 months." LAWRENCE A. GREENFIELD ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, VIOLENCE BY INTIMATES: ANALYSIS OF DATA ON CRIMES BY CURRENT OR
FORMER SPOUSES, BOYFRIENDS, AND GIRLFRIENDS 15 (1998), available at http://bjs
data.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/vi.pdf.
242. PATRICK A. LANGAN & DAVID J. LEVIN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, RECIDNISM
OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1994 at 1 (2002), available at http://www.bjs.ojp.usdoj.
gov/content/pub/pdf/rpr94.htm.
243. See Kuennen, supra note 56, at 10.
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Allowing past acts that are predictive of a certain crime into
evidence is not a novel idea. Congress has taken notice of the
predictive nature of other, certain recidivistic crimes. 244 The Federal
Rules of Evidence 413-415 make admissible past acts of sexual
abuse and child molestation in a prosecution of sexual abuse or child
molestation. 245 The Court of Appeals of Maryland has also
recognized that in sexual assault cases against the same victim, prior
sexual assaults against the current victim are probative and
admissible. 246
In Maryland, the courts and the General Assembly have already
pointed to the predictive accuracy of past acts of domestic violence.
Accordingly, an adoption of the proposal would not be anomalous.
For example, the Court of Appeals of Maryland, in Coburn v.
Coburn/ 47 held that past acts of domestic violence can be used in a
final protective order hearing. The court stated that "[ t]he fact that
there is a history of prior abusive acts implies that there is a stronger
likelihood of future abuse. " 248 The current statute that governs
protective orders specifies that the petitioner of the order should
include prior acts of domestic violence. 249 In addition, the statute that
governs child custody allows a court to consider past acts of domestic
violence. 250
In a brief to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, for a case
on appeal because prior acts of domestic violence were admitted for a
current charge of domestic violence, the State argued that the court
should extend the exception for sexual assaults, mentioned above, to
domestic violence cases. 251 Although this is commendable and
244.
245.

246.
247.
248.

249.
250.
251.

See Wayne A. Logan, Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification: Past,
Present, and Future, 34 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & Civ. CONFINEMENT 3, 11 (2008).
See FED. R. Evm. 413-415; Vartabedian, supra note 53, at 180-81. To see a
discussion on Federal Rules of Evidence 413-415, see Vartabedian, supra note 53, at
161-64. Maryland does not have an equivalent to Federal Rules of Evidence 413415. See MCLAIN, supra note 191, § 413:1.
Acuna v. State, 332 Md. 65, 75, 629 A.2d 1233, 1238 (1993); Vogel v. State, 315 Md.
458,466,554 A.2d 1231, 1234 (1989).
342Md.244,674A.2d951 (1996).
!d. at 258, 674 A.2d at 958. The court did address prior acts in Rule 5-404(b). The
court stated that Rule 5-404(b) was inapplicable in this case because the facts at hand
related to a protective order proceeding and not a criminal proceeding. Id at 260, 674
A.2d at 959. However, nowhere did the court address the value of the predictive
nature of a defendant's prior acts of domestic abuse in relation to guilt on a criminal
charge of domestic violence.
See Mo. CooEANN., FAM. LAW§ 4-504 (LexisNexis 2009).
See Mo. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW§ 9-101.1 (LexisNexis 2006).
Brief and Appendix of Appellee at 14, Howard v. Maryland, No. 2914 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 2008), 2008 WL 5023427.
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recognizes the Office of the Attorney General's belief that a
defendant's past acts of domestic violence are predictive of guilt on a
current charge, a statute as described above would be the proper
method to enact change because it would give precise guidelines to
protect the defendant's rights versus a change of the rule through case
law which may not be as specific and fail to provide proper
safeguards.
2.

Positive Aspects of the Proposal and Section 1109

a.

The admission ofprior acts helps the jury evaluate the victim's
credibility

When a victim happens to testify in a domestic violence
prosecution, the jurors may find it difficult to believe the victim. 252
They may blame the victim for not leaving the relationship and may
not understand the intricacies of the relationship. 253 When the victim
does not testify there is also juror bias; it is hard to understand why a
person would not testify after being abused. 254 The jury may also feel
that the current charged crime was an isolated event or an accident. 255
Therefore, the jury is less likely to believe the accusation against the
defendant. 256
Section 1109 and the proposal would allow the victim's testimony
or the state's accusation of domestic violence to be corroborated and
prove the truth of the charged crime. 257 Also, when a victim does not
testify but the defendant does, admitting past acts of domestic
violence limits the ability of the defendant to deny or fabricate
testimony. 258 The goal of a trial is to keep the "focus [on] the truthseeking process," and section 1109 and the proposal accomplish this
252. See Vartabedian, supra note 53, at 181.
253. Jd.
254. See id.
255. See Kovach, supra note 188, at 1152.
256. It is still possible to have an expert testify as to the intricacies of the relationship and
why the victim is not present. Although this scenario is plausible, the cost of an
expert for each domestic violence prosecution where the victim does not testify is not
economically sound. Also, it is possible that the jury will disregard the expert. See
JENNIFER G: LoNG, NAT'L DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S Ass'N, INTRODUCING EXPERT
TESTIMONY TO EXPLAIN VICTIM BEHAVIOR IN SEXUAL AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
PROSECUTIONS 18-19, 22, 34 (National District Attorneys Association: American
Prosecutors Research Institute 2007), available at http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/pub_
introducing_expert_testimony.pdf.
257. Vartabedian, supra note 53, at 182.
258. Id.
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by allowing the jury to obtain an unbiased perspective of the
victim. 259

b.

Judicial efficiency will not be decreased

Opponents argue that allowing past acts of domestic violence may
create "mini trials" because the defendant would be able to deny the
prior acts. 260 However, there are aspects of section 1109 and the
proposal that counteract this argument. Currently, the admission of
any prior acts of domestic violence rests on a judicial determination
of relevance and then admission through a narrow exception. 261
Section 1109 and the proposal make prior acts automatically relevant
and eliminate any judicial inquiry into a finding of relevance or a
finding of admission through a narrow exception. 262 If there are
numerous past acts, a judge may be able to limit all those admissions
on the grounds of waste of time, a rule that is found in the Maryland
Rules of Evidence. 263
Also at the trial level, judicial efficiency is increased because
defendants are more willing to enter into plea bargains or seek
treatment, reducing court costs. Having an abuser realize that past
acts can be used against him could trigger accountability and
treatment, thus breaking the cycle of abuse and reducing the number
of domestic violence incidents in the future. 264
At the appellate level, any decrease in judicial efficiency will be
negligible. Although the courts may have to conduct a review on
whether the prejudicial effect substantially outweighed the probative
value of the prior act of domestic violence, those courts no longer
need to evaluate trial courts' admission of prior acts of domestic
violence for relevance or under an exception. 265
Therefore, although a similar statute to section 1109 may decrease
judicial efficiency in certain areas, it will, in turn, increase efficiency

259. See Kovach, supra note 188, at 1143.
260. DeSanctis, supra note 43, at 392.
261. Linell A. Letendre, Notes & Comments, Beating Again and Again and Again: Why
Washington Needs a New Rule of Evidence Admitting Prior Acts of Domestic
Violence, 75 WASH. L. REv. 973, 1002 (2000).
262. See id. Judges and lawyers will no longer need to spend time determining, for
example, if a prior act is so similar to the charged act that it could be admitted. See
De Sanctis, supra note 43, at 394.
263. MD. R. 5-403; see also De Sanctis, supra note 43, at 393 (noting the time and effort
required by attorneys and judges to admit numerous prior acts of domestic violence).
264. Vartabedian, supra note 53, at 182-83.
265. Letendre, supra note 261, at 1002.
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in other areas, nullifying any dramatic decrease in judicial efficiency
on the whole.
c.

It works

There have been numerous positive effects with regard to domestic
violence prosecutions in those jurisdictions that have implemented
section 1109 or a similar statute. 266 For example, California
prosecutors have noted that "section 1109 has proved invaluable in
convicting recidivist batterers. " 267 Alaska prosecutors also report a
strengthened ability to prosecute domestic violence cases because of
the legislation enacted. 268 One reason the statutes are so effective is
because allowing past acts is a powerful tool to explain the victim's
behavior and it prevents juries from blaming the victim. 269 As one
prosecutor described it, "the defendant sounds 'incredibly foolish'
when arguing that the victim attacked him or fabricated the story
when the prosecution is able to call prior domestic violence victims
as witnesses to support the instant victim.'mo
The statutes have also increased reporting of domestic violence.
When victims knew that a conviction was more likely, or that
reporting a domestic violence incident could be used later at a trial,
reporting and, in turn, intervention of batterers by domestic violence
professionals occurred more often. 271
3.

Defendant's Rights are Protected

Opponents of section 11 09 and the proposal argue that such statutes
greatly prejudice the defendant's rights at trial. 272 However, section
1109 and the proposal provide safeguards that are designed to protect
the defendant.
a.

Written protections in the statute and proposal ensure
defendant's rights

Disclosing testimony and evidence that will be used to prove the
past acts of domestic violence of the defendane 73 enables the

266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.

See Kovach, supra note 188, at 1138, 1143.
/d. at 1138.
/d. at 1143.
/d.
See id. at 1138.
Vartabedian, supra note 53, at 182-83.
See id. at 166.
See CAL. EviD. CODE§ 1109(b) (West 2009).
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defendant to prepare a proper defense and counter the accusations of
the past acts. Requiring the past acts of domestic violence to have
occurred within the past ten years 274 allows the defendant to reform
his conduct without having a prior act of domestic violence haunt
him, thus providing another way section 1109 and the proposal
protect the defendant's rights.
In the proposal, the requirement that the past act of domestic
violence be proven by a preponderance of the evidence (or in the
alternative, by clear and convincing evidence) protects the
defendant's rights because the prosecution will have to substantiate
their claims of past acts of domestic violence, thus limiting the
admission of false claims into evidence. 275 The requirement of a jury
instruction would also protect the defendant's rights by ensuring that
the jury only uses the evidence of prior acts for limited purposes. 276
Having prior acts admissible as long as the prejudicial effect does
not substantially outweigh the probative value also protects the
defendant's right by excluding the extreme past act where a judge
determines that a jury would be unable to properly use the past act. 277
The requirement in the proposal that only past acts of domestic
violence against the current victim be admitted into evidence is
another safeguard in place to safeguard the defendant's rights.
Although others have argued that past domestic violence against any
prior victim is predictive of a current domestic violence charge, 278
allowing a past act of domestic violence against only the current
victim in the case better explains how the past act predicts the
probability that the defendant committed the current charge and
better elaborates on the controlling environment of the current
relationship. A past act of domestic violence committed against a
different victim would not have the same predictive or explanatory
value and would unduly burden the defendant. 279
274. !d. § 1109(e). Section 1109 allows the admission of ten-year-old prior acts of
domestic violence that are in the interest of justice. !d.
275. See People v. Moore, 117 P.3d 1, 3 (Colo. App. 2004).
276. See supra Part III.D.2.b.
277. See CAL. Evm. CODE § 1352 (West 2009); id. § 11 09(a)(1 ); Mo. R. 5-403. However,
California courts rarely find that a prejudicial effect outweighs the probative value of
evidence of prior acts. See, e.g., People v. Dallas, 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 521 (Ct. App.
2008); People v. Williams, 70 Cal. Rptr. 3d 845 (Ct. App. 2008); People v. Morton,
70 Cal. Rptr. 3d 827 (Ct. App. 2008); People v. Cabrera, 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d 373 (Ct.
App. 2007).
278. See Letendre, supra note 261, at 977.
279. See GREENFIELD ET AL., supra note 241, at 15 ("Nearly a third of female victims of
nonlethal intimate violence were victimized at least twice during the previous six
months."). Cf State v. Lough, 853 P.2d 920, 925 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993), aff'd, 889
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The problem offalse claims

Opponents of section 1109 also argue that in the event of a false
claim, either in the current charge or a claim of a past act of domestic
violence, the defendant's rights will be infringed. 28° For example, if
the victim fabricates the current charge, then a legitimate past act of
domestic violence could be used to his detriment at trial. However,
the pioneer of section 1109, Marie De Sanctis, responds with her
anti-coincidence argument. 281 She states that it is very unlikely that
one man would twice be the victim of a false accusation of domestic
violence. 282 Therefore, either the prior incident or the current
accusation is valid. Second, a man falsely accused of domestic
violence would probably not have a history of domestic violence as
so few domestic violence incidents are ever reported. 283 Therefore,
the innocent defendant falsely accused of domestic violence would
rarely or never have a past domestic violence incident haunt him and
would be unaffected by section 1109 or the proposal.
c.

Constitutional protections on equal protection and due process
grounds

Defendants that have challenged the admission of prior acts
evidence have argued that the statutes are unconstitutional on equal
protection and due process grounds. 284 However, states such as
California and Alaska, rejected challenges to such statutes on
constitutional grounds. 285
In People v. Jennings/ 86 the California Court of Appeal upheld
section 1109 against an equal protection challenge. 287 The defendant

280.

281.
282.
283.
284.

285.
286.
287.

P.2d 487 (Wash. 1999) ("Such [prior acts] evidence is generally inadmissible because
it could lead a jury to determine that a defendant committed the crime with which he
or she is charged simply because he or she committed a similar crime in the past.").
See De Sanctis, supra note 43, at 390-92 (outlining critics' arguments that defendants
are falsely accused because of pressure by law enforcement, that women exaggerate
or imagine abusive incidents after finding out about prior acts of domestic violence,
and that juries do not effectively weigh inflammatory evidence).
/d. at 390-92.
/d.
/d. at 391.
See, e.g., People v. Jennings, 97 Cal. Rptr. 2d 727 (Ct. App. 2000); People v. Hoover,
92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 208 (Ct. App. 2000); People v. Johnson, 91 Cal. Rptr. 2d 596 (Ct.
App. 2000); People v. Poplar, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 320 (Ct. App. 1999); see also Fuzzard
v. State, 13 P.3d 1163 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000).
See supra note 284.
97 Cal. Rptr. 2d 727.
/d. at 734.
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argued that treating those accused of domestic violence differently
from those accused of other crimes violated the Equal Protection
Clause. 288 The court reasoned that defming a class in legislation is
permissible as long as the distinctions have some relevance to the
purpose of defining the classes. 289 The court concluded that the
distinction of domestic violence defendants is relevant to the
legislative purpose of easing the difficulty of domestic violence
prosecutions for which the distinction was made. 290
In People v. Johnson, 291 the California Court of Appeal for the
Third District held section 1109 valid against a due process
challenge. 292 The court found that section 11 09 is analogous to
California Evidence Code section 1108, which allows the admission
of prior sex offenses in a sex offense case. 293 The court then pointed
to the case People v. Falsetta, 294 where the court upheld section 1108
against a due process challenge. In Falsetta, the California Supreme
Court concluded that section 1108 does not violate due process
because it has adequate defendant safeguards similar to those in
section 1109. 295 Although it cannot be definitively stated that the
Maryland appellate courts will follow the same reasoning as the
California courts or that Maryland courts will hold the Maryland
Constitution to the same protective standard as that of California or
the U.S. Constitution, it can be inferred that a proposal similar to
section 1109 is on sound constitutional grounds with respect to equal
protection and due process.
d.

Constitutional protections under the Confrontation Clause

Section 1109 and the proposal are still subject to the protections of
the Confrontation Clause and Crawford, further protecting the
defendant's rights. Any evidence or testimony a prosecutor uses to
prove a past act of domestic violence must survive an analysis under
Crawford and its progeny, otherwise it will be inadmissible. 296 For
/d.
!d. at 735 (referencing Estelle v. Dorrough, 420 U.S. 534, 538-39 (1975)).
!d.
91 Cal. Rptr. 2d 596.
!d. at 597.
!d. at 600; CAL. Evro. CODE§ 1108 (West 2009).
986 P.2d 182 (Cal. 1999).
!d. at 188. Compare § 1108 (providing certain safeguards to the defendant, including
disclosure of the evidence to the defendant), with § 1109 (providing the same
safeguards to the defendant, in addition to a ten-year limitation for admitting evidence
of prior acts).
296. Melissa Moody, A Blow to Domestic Violence Victims: Applying the "Testimonial
Statements" Test in Crawford v. Washington, 11 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 387,

288.
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290.
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295.
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example, the victim's testimonial statements made in Giles,
ultimately held inadmissible, were originally admitted through
section 11 09. 297
The fact that evidence admitted under section 1109 or the proposal
are subject to Crawford and its progeny may make it seem that the
difficulties of proving a domestic violence claim under Crawford and
its progeny would resurface. However, the benefits of a statute
similar to section 1109 are not neutralized. Because the standard of
proof in the proposal is a preponderance of the evidence (or, in the
alternative, clear and convincing evidence) less evidence is needed to
prove the prior act. This means that proof of a prior act of domestic
violence can be established without aid of testimonial statements by
the defendant and proven instead through non-testimonial evidence
such as witness statements, photographs, and testimony from police
officers responding to an ongoing emergency, etc. 298 Therefore,
Crawford's effect on section 11 09 and a similar statute would not be
significant while still preserving the defendant's rights under the
Sixth Amendment.
V. CONCLUSION
Domestic violence creates a unique type of prosecution where
physical evidence may be lacking and the victim often recants,
refuses to cooperate, or is murdered. 299 While hearsay exceptions
prior to Crawford offered a solution, post Crawford prosecutorial
tools such as 911 calls, statements made to doctors or social workers,
and the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception have become more
difficult to use. 30° Crawford, along with the propensity rule, has
created a scenario where domestic violence prosecutions have
become arduous. Difficult prosecutions may mean an increase in the
already daunting domestic violence statistics. Those like Veronica
Williams will not have justice served.
The proposal for a statute similar to section 1109 allows juries to
consider past acts to show a disposition for guilt on the current charge
of domestic violence and provide context of the controlling nature of

297.
298.
299.
300.

399 (2005). See, e.g., People v. Moran, No. B204002, 2009 WL 162293, at *I (Cal.
Ct. App. 2009); People v. Suniga, No. F052710, 2008 WL 3090622, at *13 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2008); People v. Younger, No. All0031, 2007 WL 1848976, at *9 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2007).
See People v. Giles, No. Bl66937, 2009 WL 457832, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009).
See supra Part III.C.2.
See supra Part II.B.
See supra Part lii.C.2.
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the abusive relationship. 301 Enacting such a statute would provide a
solution to the obstacles prosecutors face in domestic violence cases
post-Crawford while still safeguarding a defendant's rights in a
manner consistent with the Constitution.
This proposal is not a novel idea. Other states joined California
even before Crawford became a hindrance to domestic violence
cases. 302 Maryland courts and the legislature have indicated a belief
that a past act of domestic violence has predictive value for a future
act of domestic violence. 303 The next logical step, in the wake of
Crawford and its progeny, is to adopt a statute similar to the proposal
described. A victim of domestic violence will again have some
protection when she cannot testify or refuses to testify. The search
for truth would again be in harmony with a defendant's rights m
domestic violence prosecutions.
Jay A. Abarbanel

30 I.
302.
303.

See supra Part IV.A.l.
See supra Part III.D.2.b.
See supra Part IV .A. I.

